For generations, American candidates have asked voters a familiar question: Are you better off now than you were four years ago?

For Africa, the more urgent question at the end of 2025 is sharper — and inseparable from U.S. foreign policy: Are you better off than you were a year ago, after Washington dramatically changed how it engages the continent?

This year marked one of the most abrupt shifts in U.S.–Africa policy in decades. Longstanding humanitarian and health programs were ended or frozen. Development assistance was curtailed or put on hold. Trade policy was elevated, but often without the diplomatic or development tools that once supported it. Security cooperation continued — and in some cases intensified — even as civilian protection and diplomatic engagement receded.

For millions of Africans, the consequences were immediate.

More than 239 million people across Africa now require urgent humanitarian assistance and protection, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Conflicts are growing longer and more violent toward civilians, climate shocks are intensifying, and displacement continues to rise. Sudan alone accounts for roughly 10 percent of all people in need worldwide. Across West Africa, violence, political instability and environmental disasters are forcing families from their homes and eroding already fragile economies.

U.S. policy changes amplified these pressures. The administration sharply reduced or shuttered USAID programming across multiple sectors. Billions of dollars in humanitarian assistance were ended or left in limbo. Food security and climate resilience programs were paused. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) — which since 2003 had saved more than 25 million lives — was effectively abandoned.

At the same time, Washington pursued a “trade, not aid” approach, while imposing shifting tariff policies that disrupted supply chains and investment planning. Diplomatic staffing was thinned. Development tools were sidelined faster than private-sector alternatives could realistically replace them. That diplomatic pullback became more explicit late in the year, when President Trump ordered the recall of multiple U.S. ambassadors from African posts, further reducing America’s on-the-ground presence and weakening already strained channels of political engagement.

The human cost was real. Reuters reported this fall on a nine-month-old baby in northern Cameroon who died of malaria after arriving at a health center with no remaining U.S.-funded diagnostics or life-saving drugs. Until recently, American-backed community health workers routinely reached remote villages across the region. That safety net has now largely disappeared.

Compounding these effects, the administration imposed new U.S. travel restrictions on several African countries, citing security and migration concerns. The bans disrupted business travel, educational exchanges and family ties, and sent a broader signal of disengagement at a moment when African governments were seeking greater — not fewer — connections with Washington.

America’s pullback weakened U.S. influence across Africa and created openings for China and Russia to deepen their own political, economic and security ties.

Yet 2025 was not a story of unbroken decline.

Some U.S. engagement continued — and in a few areas expanded. Security cooperation remained robust. Military restrictions were loosened, and U.S. airstrikes in Somalia accelerated to a record pace, reportedly exceeding even U.S. counter-narcotics operations in the Western Hemisphere. Diplomatically, the administration brokered cease-fire agreements between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, ending months of direct hostilities, though their durability remains uncertain. African regional organizations also assumed greater leadership in peacekeeping and mediation.

Notably, after months of uncertainty, Washington also concluded a series of targeted health agreements with several African governments, aimed at sustaining cooperation on disease surveillance, vaccine access and pandemic preparedness. While far narrower than past U.S. health initiatives, these deals acknowledged the limits of a full withdrawal and underscored that even a scaled-back approach cannot entirely replace the role the United States has long played in safeguarding public health across the continent.

Economically, Africa showed resilience. The continent’s economy is expected to have grown by nearly 4 percent in 2025, outpacing global averages despite geopolitical uncertainty and trade tensions. Inflation eased across much of sub-Saharan Africa and is projected to continue moderating in 2026. Digital innovation accelerated, particularly in fintech and mobile money. Technology hubs expanded, transportation projects advanced and venture capital cautiously returned. African investors increasingly put capital to work at home.

U.S. and European firms expanded their presence in sectors ranging from technology to critical minerals. In Washington, support for extending the African Growth and Opportunity Act—which for a quarter century anchored mutually beneficial trade—has now advanced significantly: the U.S. House of Representatives recently approved a three-year extension of AGOA through 2028, a strong signal that trade with Africa still commands bipartisan support on Capitol Hill. While the bill now goes to the Senate for final approval, tariffs on African exports—once feared to rise sharply—now appear likely to remain manageable, sustaining an important foundation for U.S.–Africa commercial engagement.

After nearly four decades as a U.S. Foreign Service officer, I remain a professional optimist. Africa’s challenges are real — and in some cases severe — but they should spur smarter engagement, not retreat. Diplomacy, development and security cooperation have long worked best together. Removing one leg of that stool weakens the others.

Is Africa better off today than it was a year ago? For millions facing hunger, displacement and preventable disease, the answer is clearly no. But economic momentum, regional diplomacy and private investment offer reasons for cautious hope.

As 2026 approaches, the more important question is whether the United States recalibrates its Africa policy — restoring life-saving programs, stabilizing trade policy and re-investing diplomatically — or continues down a narrower path. A safer, healthier and more prosperous Africa is not charity. It is a strategic investment the United States can still choose to make.